Industry sees openings as it waits for specifics
Even with sparse details, Golden Dome remains one of the most talked about initiatives in national defense. Its reach has expanded beyond the major primes to commercial space firms exploring dual-use avenues.
"There's going to be a real opportunity for industry," said Mikhail Grinberg, partner at Renaissance Strategic Advisors, speaking at the Baird Defense and Government Conference.
Grinberg argued that Golden Dome is a legitimate national security need regardless of its association with the administration that launched it. "There are a lot of things that Golden Dome could accomplish however it evolves," he said. "It might get renamed in the future, but the things that are really important is that there are real challenges to be solved."
He pushed back on the idea that the program remains completely undefined. He pointed to the 2025 appropriations bill enacted through reconciliation, which he said provides insight into "more than 80% of what will comprise Golden Dome. Between sensors and effectors, we know what these systems will be. Many of them are programs of record, and they're going to continue to be funded, and reconciliation funding being a plus up."
Grinberg predicted Golden Dome will become a "flagship initiative" made up of dozens of programs and will serve as an early test of the administration's acquisition transformation plans aimed at bringing commercial technology into national security programs faster.
Harrison: Still too early for forecasts
At the same conference, Todd Harrison, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, took a more restrained view.
"What is Golden Dome? We don't yet know," Harrison said. "We don't know the architecture. We don't know what threats it's going to be targeted at, or what capacity of threats it's going to be designed to intercept." Still, he said it is reasonable to expect space technologies to dominate the architecture. "Space is going to be an integral part of nearly all of that. Space is the ideal domain for sensing for many of the types of threats." Some threats, such as small drones, must be detected from the ground. But for faster moving systems, "aircraft, cruise missiles, all the way up to ICBMs and FOBS," he said space based sensors offer the best chance to track from launch to impact. A Fractional Orbital Bombardment System, or FOBS, places a payload into a partial low orbit before deorbiting it toward a target. Unlike traditional ICBMs, which follow predictable polar trajectories, a FOBS can approach the United States from any direction. Harrison also highlighted the need for space-based communications nodes to tie sensors and interceptor weapons together.
"There is no better place to do that than space," he said.
Ground and airborne sensors will remain important, but the speed and precision required for Golden Dome will depend heavily on orbital infrastructure. "Space is going to play a huge role regardless of what the ultimate Golden Dome architecture ends up being," he added. In efforts to tighten timelines and close the kill chain, "space is going to be the key ingredient in all of this."
Notice to industry on 'midcourse' space interceptors
A new Golden Dome contracting notice offers a glimpse into the Pentagon's current thinking on the program.
The Space Systems Command last week alerted contractors to expect a solicitation, formally a "request for prototype proposal," around Dec. 7 for space based interceptors. The opportunity focuses on "kinetic midcourse interceptor solutions only," with awards projected for February 2026. SSC plans to issue multiple fixed price other transaction agreements and may fold in prize competitions as part of the effort. The emphasis on midcourse interceptors is notable. President Trump's executive order frames space-based interceptors as tools to strike missiles during the boost phase, or in the first minutes after launch, when the rocket is bright and easier to track. Achieving that from orbit requires a large constellation positioned close enough to engage within seconds, a demanding requirement both technically and financially. Midcourse interceptors pursue a warhead later, after the boost phase is complete. The extra time to react reduces the constellation size and engagement speed needed, but it shifts the burden to the sensor side. Distinguishing a live warhead from decoys in midcourse is one of the hardest problems in missile defense. Experts note that each option carries different architectural demands, and analysts like Harrison have argued that midcourse defense is the more realistic near-term path.
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